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Introduction
The theory of affections has seen a renewed 
conceptual interest both in the role played 
in the formulation of power structures in 
modernity, which remains important in 
understanding the present form of Nation 
State, and in the possibility to formulate a 
new interpretation of the social relation-
ship useful to surpass the classical psycho-
logical lectures.
We aim here to reconsider an affect which 
in contemporary language is tinged with 
theological nuances: the affect of fides. We 
can translate the word using the modern 
terms of trust and belief, but also loyalty. 
The choice of this particular affect is due to 
the centrality that, in our view, it occupies 
in modern contract theories, and to its abil-
ity to reflect, with its multiple conceptual 
stratification, different perspectives and 
political proposals. In order to clarify the 
terms of this discussion, we will henceforth 
use the term fides, alongside with different 
meanings which overlap within it, to illus-
trate two different and divergent proposals 
that have emerged during the seventeenth 
century. We consider, in particular, the 
thought of Spinoza opposed to the social 
contract theories by Hobbes in order to 
understand the modern theoretical break 
with previous political concepts; in par-
ticular, we will briefly analyze the different 
conceptions of Societas civilis that emerge 
from this division.
The background of these considerations is 
the analysis of modern philosophy‘s use of 
the theory of affections.
The XVII century witnessed the rise of so-
cial contract theory. It draws on the con-
cept of the individual, conceived as isolated 
from others, located in the original state of 
nature (pre-social), unable to develop its 
rational part. It is therefore a victim of its 
own passions, but even more so those of 
others. The dominant sentiments emerg-
ing in Hobbes‘ Leviathan are therefore 
those of awe and fear. They derive from the 
constant uncertainty of one‘s power and 
strength; the uncertainty of being able to 
maintain everyone‘s domination over oth-
ers and thus to suffer in turn the others‘ 
power. From the necessity to control these 
emotions in a rational way emerges the 
contractual proposal to transfer the power 
to an authority (singular or plural) whom 
all subjects must obey.
Philosophical movements such as neos-
toicism and philosophical works such as 
Les passions de l‘ame by Descartes, testify 
in their „rationalist“ proposal the need to 
keep a constant control over the passions. 
They open the way for the famous dialec-
tics of reason and passion, a central theme 
throughout the Enlightenment. This need 
to dominate the passions arouses from the 
complex Cartesian metaphysical theory 
and from its conception of the individual 
always split between body and soul, reason 
and instinct.
These two models are the ones which have 
prevailed; this conception of individual and 
society and this approach to the passions 
still dominate common sense when we talk 
about human affections.
The paper follows an itinerary across three 
authors of the modern age. At first we try 
to delineate the theory of affection by Des-
cartes, and the birth of the dichotomy of 
body and soul through the focus of two of 
the most important works by Descartes: 
Méditations métaphysiques and Traité sur 
les passions de l‘âme. Then, by analyzing 
the works of Hobbes (Leviathan), and Spi-
noza (Ethic and Political treatise) we will 
describe in which terms the subject carry-
ing his affective baggage interacts in a po-
litical space.
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Larvatus prodeo: the irrational and the 
Cartesian‘s moral
The way to define the passions1 as some-
thing simply contrary to reason, as an up-
heaval, and definitely as a less noble part 
and dark side of man, is inherited from the 
medieval interpretation of ancient philoso-
phy, forming the rationalist theory of the 
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. 
First of all, we aim to ask for the origins of 
the opposition between reason and pas-
sions, mainly to investigate the condition-
ing that makes these two concepts notions 
that remain very difficult to understand be-
cause they cannot by taken for granted. Are 
the passions a perturbation of an (initial/in-
cipient) original, neutral and rational state, 
or, are the passions innate in the human 
nature? A solution proposed by a renewed 
movement of Stoicism in modern Europe 
was to extirpate the affects, to distinguish 
a behavior that have rational sense which 
is intelligible and a irrational one stemming 
only from the emotional part.
Otherwise we can follow the example of 
Descartes, who brought to modernity the 
idea of rationalism and systematized the 
division of body and soul in ontological 
terms. The soul, seat of intelligence and of 
the logical and deductive process, has to 
fight against the passivity of the body, seat 
of irrational and external influence.
Descartes is one of those philosophers who 
support the necessity to renovate and re-
start philosophy. His Méditations méta-
physiques and the Discours de la méthode 
are inner dialogs which aim to destroy a 
critical apparatus which falls down and 
can no longer work in a century in which 
everything is changing. It is for this rea-
son that Descartes starts by rejecting and 
1 Bodei R., Geometria della passioni. Paura, spe-
ranza, felicitá: filosofia e uso politico, Feltrinelli, 
Milano, 2007.
negating everything know. The skeptical 
doubt envelops the external world making 
it unreal. How can anything be built in this 
void? What can man really knows? How to 
define the subject? Descartes answers all of 
these questions elaborating a concept: the 
thought (cogito). The subject exists only in 
the moment in which he can exercise his ra-
tional faculties; it is not important whether 
his reasoning is correct or wrong. What is 
he therefore? He is a whole of thought and 
extension, but these two substances are not 
on the same level; for Descartes a hierar-
chy exists among God, Man and the World. 
That means that the subject is formed by 
two substances which can absolutely not be 
held together, but Descartes cannot deny 
that there is a relationship between them. 
Most of the aporias and problems of the 
Cartesian system arise from the possibility 
to enable communication between Exten-
sion (body) and Thought (soul).2 This com-
munication is only seen in negative terms 
by Descartes. Our body is a part of the ex-
tension and the mind – rational as it is - has 
to protect itself from the external impulse 
which tries to corrupt the soul by mistakes 
and irrationality.
If it is true that Descartes proposes this 
dualism in a new way,3 identity arises from 
a process of internalization which radi-
cally splits the ego from the world. This 
2 The problem of the communication between body 
and soul is one of the most-discussed. In the ob-
jection to the Meditations the pineal gland as so-
lution satisfies nobody. (This problem is discussed 
in the comments to the Meditations: Descartes, 
Oeuvres de Descartes, Ch. Adam, P. Tannery, Pa-
ris, 1898).
3 Negri A., Descartes Politico o della ragionevo-
le ideologia, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2007. Accor-
ding to Negri, the Cartesian thought is born in 
a moment of crisis caused by the defeat of the 
humanism‘s ideals and the victory of the politics 
absolutism. It is with a „reasonable ideology“ that 
Descartes tries to face the crisis trying to develop 
the hope to be able to liberate the individual from 
its irrationality.
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relationship becomes more vertical in the 
Meditations4 where the only guarantee of 
the individual‘s actual existence arises from 
an internal relationship between God and 
the Ego. God is the measure of man’s exis-
tence and the only possibility to know the 
world. The reason is no more an adequate 
instrument to know the world. Knowledge 
of reality comes from a powerful and tran-
scendent God.5
“[...] la scoperta dell‘esistenza dell‘io: 
questa nasce nel dubbio ma non 
dal dubbio, é precedente alla crisi e 
all‘isolamento […] Si direbbe che la 
separazione, apprezzata nel rapporto 
io-mondo si svolga ora e si fissi nel rap-
porto io-divinitá […] Dio é dunque in 
me, non nel mondo […] il mondo non é 
una realtá di cui impadronirsi, ma una 
raltá da produrre.”6
How does this separate and independent 
existence act in the world of passions?
“Je ne suis point d‘opinion qu‘on 
les doive (les passions) entierement 
mepriser, ny mesme qu‘on doive 
s‘exempter d‘avoir des passions; il suffit 
qu‘on les rende sujettes á la raison, et 
4 Negri A., Descartes Politico o della ragionevole 
ideologia, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2007, pp. 78- 82.
5 Descartes denies the capacity of the individual to 
understand the Absolute completely by means of 
reason. This denial is influenced by a fideistic and 
mystic tension; these are still the religious senti-
ments and experiences of faith that dominate the 
cogito.
6 Negri A., Descartes Politico o della ragionevole 
ideologia, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2007 p. 147-153. 
„[...]The discovery of the ego‘s existence: his birth 
in doubt and not from the doubt, it comes before 
the crisis and the isolation […] we can say that the 
split appreciated in the relationship between ego-
world develops now and consolidates itself in the 
relationship ego-divinity […] God is so inside my-
self, not in the world […] the world is not a reali-
ty to be possessed, but a realty to be produced” 
(own translation of the author).
lorsqu‘on les a ainsy apprivoisées, elles 
sont quelquefois d‘autant plus utiles 
qu‘elles penchent plus vers l‘exces.”7
1649 was the year in which the Traité sur les 
passions de l‘âme was printed. This book is 
the result of a long private correspondence 
between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth 
of Bohemia published thanks to the prod-
ding of the Queen of Sweden, Christina. The 
treatise is divided into three parts which 
analyze the nature and the characteristics 
of the passions in order to determine the 
real power that the soul can exercise over 
the passions. The intent of Descartes is 
“curative”:8 he tries to demonstrate to the 
Princess of Bohemia that her numerous 
health problems are the consequences of 
the soul‘s affections. Despite this approach, 
for Descartes the passions never represents 
pathology of the soul; they should not be 
fiercely eradicated but rationally made 
harmless and domesticated; here the moral 
intent of the treatise emerges explicitly.
“Sinon que la petite glande qui est au 
milieu du cerveau, pouvant estre pous-
sée d‘un costé par l‘ame, & de l‘autre 
par les esprits animaux, qui ne sont que 
des corps [...] il arrive souvent que ces 
deux implusions sont contraires […] 
entre l‘effort dont les esprits poussent 
la glande pour causer en l‘ame le desir 
de quelque chose, & celuy dont l‘ame la 
repousse par la volonté qu‘elle a de fuir 
la mesme chose. […] Et c‘est de lá qu‘on 
a pris occasion d‘imaginer en elle deux 
7 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, Ch. Adam, P. 
Tannery, Paris, 1898. vol. IV p. 287 „I am not of 
the opinion that we should completely despise 
(the passions), nor that we should exempt to have 
passions, we just need to make them subject to 
reason, and when we do so, they are sometimes 
more useful as they remain excessive“ (own trans-
lation of the author).
8 This work by Descartes is often considered as one 
of the first contributions to neurobiology.
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puissances qui se combatent.”9
By taking cognizance of the contrast, the 
fight, between body and soul, Descartes 
suggests to face the passions with our ratio-
nal part, using the will10 to be able to choose 
the better, the Good. The semantic universe 
is that of morals, it destined to “acquerir un 
empire tres-absolu sur toutes leurs pas-
sions, si on employait assez d‘industrie á 
les dresser, & les conduire.”11 
This is the activity that the author judges as 
the most virtuous in order to acquire a ra-
tional and absolute order in the sentiment‘s 
life.
It should be noted that Descartes use to de-
scribe the passions with terms (as absolute 
empire or  leading) that recur in his political 
writings, which is particularly interesting 
since Descartes had a self-imposed rule to 
never intervene in the disputes of his time 
(especially the political ones). The moral 
problem in Descartes‘ philosophy gives us 
back a language that could not be more 
9 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, Ch. Adam, P. 
Tannery, Paris, 1898. vol. XI. p.68-72 „Conside-
ring that the little gland which is in the middle of 
the brain, can be pushed on one side by  the soul, 
and on the other by the animal spirits, which are 
only bodies [...] it often happens that these two 
impulse are in conflict [...] between the effort 
which spirits push the gland to cause in the soul 
to desire something, and those that the soul re-
pel by the will to escape the same thing. [...] And 
is from this that we took the opportunity to ima-
gine two powers which fight“ (own translation of 
the author).
10 In the words of Descartes: „on les peut conside-
rer comme ses propres armes, & penser que les 
ames sont plus fortes ou plus foibles, á raison de 
ce qu‘elles peuvent plus ou moins suivre ces juge-
ments, & resister aux passions presentes qui leur 
sont contraires“  Descartes, Oeuvres de Descar-
tes, Ch. Adam, P. Tannery, Paris, 1898. p.73.
11 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, Ch. Adam, P. 
Tannery, Paris, 1898. p. 77 „acquire a very abso-
lute empire over all passions, if we employed suf-
ficient industry to train and to lead them“ (own 
translation of the author).
political.12 Larvatus prodeo,13 Descartes 
told us. Moving from Paris to Amster-
dam (where he lived as “dans le desert”14) 
he chose to live isolated from political and 
social space. The political absolutism, that 
characterized the State of the XVII century, 
imposed this style of life to a thinker who 
would like to remain a “free thinker”. The 
biography of Descartes is the accomplish-
ment of his temporary morality.15 The re-
nunciation to change the world order and 
the choice to obey (at least formally) the es-
tablished rules testifies an idea of freedom 
that can be developed only in a heterono-
mous space. This is the ideal of a bourgeois 
freedom, born in conjuncture with the first 
development of commercial capitalism and 
with the creation of individuality both in 
religion and in politics.
12 This is the main thesis in: Negri A., Descartes Po-
litico o della ragionevole ideologia, Manifestoli-
bri, Roma, 2007.
13 To go forward masked.
14 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, Ch. Adam, P. 
Tannery, Paris, 1898. vol. I p.14.
15 Descartes speech about his temporary morality in 
the Discours de la méthode: „[...]afin que je ne de-
meurasse point irrésolu en mes actions pendant 
que la raison m‘obligerait de l‘ être en mes juge-
ments, et que je ne laissasse pas de vivre dés lors 
le plus heureusement que je pourrais, je me for-
mai une morale par provision , qui ne consistait 
qu‘en trois ou quatre maximes dont je veux bien 
vous faire part. La première était d‘obéir aux lois 
et aux coutumes de mon pays, retenant constam-
ment la religion en laquelle Dieu m‘a fait la grâce 
d’être instruit dés mon enfance [...]Ma seconde 
maxime était d’être le plus ferme que je pourrais, 
et de ne suivre pas moins constamment les opi-
nions les plus douteuse lorsque je m‘y serais une 
fois déterminé que si elles eussent été très assurés 
[…] Ma troisième maxime était de tacher toujours 
plutôt á me vaincre que la fortune et á changer 
mes désirs que l‘ordre du monde[...] Enfin, pour 
conclusion de cette morale, je m‘avisais de faire 
une revue sur les diverses occupations qu‘ont les 
hommes en cette vie pour tâcher á faire choix de 
la meilleure“ Descartes, Discours de la méthode, 
Ernest Flammarion Éditeur, Paris, 1908 p.16-18.
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What remains of the summum bounum 
(highest good)16 and of the ambition to heal 
from passion? Descartes does not say any 
more about this argument, but invites us 
to have trust in our rational capacity and 
belief in the Absolute, whose will remains 
unknowable and transcendental.
Ultimately it is faith17 which saves the sub-
ject, the trust that the individual can have 
in rational thought and in God as a guaran-
tee that no evil spirit can deceive it. 
It is this considerably less rational reliance 
that guides a big part of Descartes‘ theory 
of action. Temporary morality remains the 
precarious context in which the individuals 
have to act.
Inter arma silent leges, Hobbes and the 
coercive delegation of the pact.
Hobbes is universally considered the father 
of modern political theory and it is not 
surprising that he speaks about the use of 
passion in the social and political context. 
In the Leviathan Hobbes dedicates much 
space to the rules that act in the building of a 
human community, transforming a chaotic 
multitudo in a well ordered people. Where 
does he place the connection between the 
representative structure of the State and the 
singularity of the individual? Modern polit-
16 “Je croy que, comme il n‘y a aucun bien au mon-
de, excepté le bon sens, qu‘on puisse absolument 
nommer bien, il n‘y a aussi aucun mal, dont on ne 
puisse tirer quelque avantage, ayant le bon sens.” 
„I think, as there is no good in the world, ex-
cept the good sense, that we can absolutely name 
good, there is also no bad, from which one can-
not receive some benefit, having the good sense“ 
(own translation of the author).
17 „[...]les vérités révélées qui y conduisent sont au-
dessus de notre intelligence, je n‘eusse osé les sou-
mettre à la faiblesse de mes raisonnements, et je 
pensais que, pour entreprendre de les examiner, et 
y réussir, il était besoin d‘avoir quelque extraordi-
naire assistance du Ciel et d‘être plus qu‘homme“ 
Descartes, Discours de la méthode, Ernest Flam-
marion Éditeur, Paris, 1908, p.7.
ical theory and of course Hobbes describe 
the political relationship between the citi-
zen and the State as vertical and transcen-
dental. If the citizen spends his life within 
the State as a private citizen submitting 
to a pact that is impossible to renovate or 
abrogate, how can his happiness and free-
dom be developed, and where is the space 
for his sentiments in the public area? The 
aim of the social contract is to constitute 
the political conditions within which the 
citizen can feel himself protected from ex-
ternal violence. The pact is also an exigency 
of rationalizing the original passionate and 
uncontrolled affections of the State of Na-
ture. The political significance attributed to 
the affections in modern thought suddenly 
changes its aim by facing the impossibil-
ity of dominating the sentiments, and by 
understanding that the stability of a State 
can result only in the rational utilization of 
the sentiments. In this way the irrational-
ity that political theory tries to pull out of 
the social relationship returns in a renewed 
form which expresses its power through 
the sentiments using them as a form of ad-
ministration.
If Mersenne, the promoter of the Répub-
lique des lettres, pursues the translation 
of all works by Hobbes with enthusiasm, 
Descartes‘ opinion is the opposite, defining 
Hobbes‘ philosophy as even dangerous.18 
The reason is very simple, in his extremely 
mechanical approach, Hobbes, abandons 
every ideal man‘s autonomy and every 
moral dimension of human actions. The re-
nunciation of finalism and even of the pre-
tense of a human self determination is the 
deeper sense of this Mechanism.
The Mechanism, especially as developed 
in Spinoza‘s thought (here as it is analyzed 
18 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, Ch. Adam, P. 
Tannery, Paris, 1898. vol. IV p. 67.
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by Deleuze19), deletes every finalist deposit, 
every general and abstract definition of the 
concept of essence. Without the essence 
which drives human actions on the basis 
of prearranged values, the system of judg-
ment becomes a pure act of singularity. 
This is the big difference between moral-
ity and ethics: ethics need to cast aside the 
transcendental universal to implement the 
possibility of an immanent action.
This change causes a real earthquake on the 
ontological field, but this is another kind 
of problem that we cannot analyze in this 
context; what matters now is only a small 
part of this change, in particular the effect 
on the theory of the sentiments, a change 
that naturally influences the approach of 
the social-political theory. Good and evil 
are no longer written with capital letters 
in modern philosophy, but they are the 
result of the direct movement and thrust 
of the sentiment, which organizes choices 
and rational life based on attraction and 
repulsions. The passions are vectors in this 
context which direct human choice, and 
even if they act in cooperation with ratio-
nal processes they would still represent a 
problem in Hobbes‘ philosophy. This prob-
lem emerges in the context of social coexis-
tence, because the thrust of the sentiments 
still lies in a free and unconditional de-
velopment of everybody‘s power. Hobbes 
defines freedom as a negative and passive 
experience for the individual; freedom is 
only the absence of obstacles in the human 
actions. For Hobbes this is the reason for 
the bellum omnium contra omnes; without 
regulation, the action of each individual 
is unlimited. As a consequence fear is the 
19 The difference between morality and ethics is one 
of the best know consideration by Deleuze in his 
courses at the University of Vincennes. Deleuze, 
cours à l‘université de Vincennes, Les cours de gil-
les deleuze www.webdeleuze.com. p.48-49.
dominant sentiment, because everyone is 
obliged to defend himself or attack others. 
But the law of Nature is also an unexpressed 
theorem of reason for Hobbes:
“[...] Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each 
man hath, to use his own power, as he 
will himselfe, for the preservation of 
his own Nature; that is to say, of his 
own Life; and consequently, of doing 
any thing, which in his own Judgement, 
and Reason, hee shall conceive to be 
the aptest means thereunto.By LIB-
ERTY, is understood, according to the 
proper signification of the word, the 
absence of externall Impediments[…]
LAW OF NATURE, (Lex Naturalis) is 
a Precept, or general Rule, found out by 
Reason, by which a man is forbidden to 
do, that, which is destructive of his life, 
or taketh away the means of preserving 
the same; and to omit, that, by which he 
thinketh it may be best preserved. For 
though they that speak of this subject, 
use to confound Jus, and Lex, Right 
and Law; yet they ought to be distin-
guished; because RIGHT, consisteth in 
liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas 
LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one 
of them: so that Law, and Right, differ 
as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; 
which in one and the same matter are 
inconsistent.”20
This theorem of reason is still present in 
each individual but it doesn’t have the nec-
essary strength to develop this rationality 
which needs to be imposed from a coercive 
power.
Hobbes, as well as Descartes, cultivates the 
rationalist dream of releasing the individu-
al from the passions. Freedom comes only 
20 Hobbes T., Leviathan, Routledge Thoemmes 
Press, London, 1992. pp. 116-117.
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from the comprehension of the mechanis-
tic order, but this change cannot happen in 
the State of Nature; for Hobbes a process 
is necessary to universalize the only virtue 
necessary to the attainment of peace: obe-
dience.
What happens after drawing up the con-
tract? The Leviathan, the sacred monster 
of the Old Testament, establishes a model 
and hierarchy of values, determined by an 
abstract rationality. These values need to 
be imposed from the top down; with the 
use of the sword, the natural law changes 
and evolves into heteronomous obliga-
tions. The sovereign intervenes to univer-
salize the moral law that in the particular 
passions cannot find a way to function. 
Consensus and the problem of command-
obedience present themselves in Hobbes‘ 
political universe in a new way. Consensus 
does have not to be discussed; it is a cer-
tainty in normalizing society post-contract. 
The individuals (the citizens) have already 
granted trust in their sovereign by means of 
the pact, representing the unity of all citi-
zens. The concept of “Person” makes this 
mechanism of representation by Hobbes 
explicit:
“A PERSON, is he whose words or ac-
tions are considered, either as his own, 
or as representing the words or actions 
of an other man, or of any other thing 
to whom they are attributed, whether 
Truly or by Fiction. When they are con-
sidered as his owne, then is he called 
a Naturall Person: And when they are 
considered as representing the words 
and actions of an other, then is he a 
Feigned or Artificiall person. [...] that 
a Person, is the same that an Actor is, 
both on the Stage and in common Con-
versation; and to Personate, is to Act, or 
Represent himselfe, or an other; and he 
that acteth another, is said to beare his 
Person, or act in his name [...] the Per-
son is the Actor; and he that owneth his 
words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In 
which case the Actor acteth by Author-
ity. For that which in speaking of goods 
and possessions, is called an Owner, 
and in latine Dominus, in Greeke Ku-
rios; speaking of Actions, is called Au-
thor. And as the Right of possession, is 
called Dominion; so the Right of doing 
any Action, is called AUTHORITY. 
So that by Authority, is alwayes un-
derstood a Right of doing any act: and 
Done By Authority, done by Commis-
sion, or Licence from him whose right 
it is.”21
Therefore, people become a unity by the 
construction of the “artificial person”, by 
the authority. This conception of repre-
sentation is sharply criticized by Rousseau 
who, in the century of the Enlightenment, 
finds this kind of abstraction in the pact 
system deeply irrational. This idea of rep-
resentation, impose the ideal construction 
of a totality that eliminated the plurality of 
the different parts and the contrasting in-
terests in the State.  But what exactly is “the 
people”, if it is not an empiric reality, if it is 
just a production of the logical of political 
unity?
It is an abstraction and in this abstraction it 
is necessary to believe if one would live in 
peace.22 It is exactly this sentiment of trust 
that created the pact and justified the idea 
of sovereignty as representation.
We aim to analyze the sentiment of trust as 
the triggering factor of the pact. Is it pos-
sible to develop the rational potential in the 
21 Hobbes T., Leviathan, Routledge Thoemmes 
Press, London, 1992. pp.147-148.
22 See Duso G., La logica del potere. Storia concet-
tuale come filosofia politica, Polimetrica, Milano, 
2007. pp. 157-177.
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State of Nature without resort to an abso-
lute monarchy and strict authority?
To find the answer to this question we need 
to move out of the limits of the pact-theory, 
and start questioning another author, who, 
in the XVII century, tried to give a more 
radical solution for this problem.
Spinoza‘s anomaly and the complex 
society.
Spinoza breaks in a very turbulent way with 
the theoretical tradition discussed above; 
placing himself in the uncomfortable po-
sition of already thinking against moder-
nity. Our author categorically rejects the 
Cartesian proposal, he cannot accept the 
opposition and the division between mind 
and body, governed by an obscure cause 
and their union, governed by an even more 
obscure and indecipherable pineal gland, 
which should ensure their communication 
and unity.
“Non defuerunt tamen viri praestan-
tissimi (quorum labori et industriae 
nos multum debere fatemur), qui de 
recta vivendi ratione praeclara multa 
scripserint et plena prudentiae consilia 
mortalibus dederint; verum affectuum 
naturam et vires et quid contra mens in 
iisdem moderandis possit, nemo, quod 
sciam, determinavit. Scio equidem 
celeberrimum Cartesium, licet etiam 
crediderit mentem in suas actiones 
absolutam habere potentiam, affectus 
tamen humanos per primas suas cau-
sas explicare simulque viam ostendere 
studuisse, qua mens in affectus absolu-
tum habere possit imperium; sed,  mea 
quidem sententia, nihil praeter magni 
sui ingenii acumen ostendit, ut suo 
loco demonstrabo.”23
23 Spinoza B., Spinoza Opera, C. Gebhardt, Heidel-
berg / Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 
Here Spinoza refuses the concept of the in-
dividual as separate from the world; an in-
dependent substance that results from the 
activity of a solitary cogito.
The break with the contractarian thought is 
clearly opposed to Hobbes as it is shown in 
a letter to Jelles in 1674:
“Quantum ad Politicam spectat, discri-
men inter me, & Hobbesium, de quo 
interrogas, in hoc consistit, quod ego 
naturale Jus semper sartum tectum 
conservo, quodque Supremo Magistra-
tui qualibet Urbe non plus in subditos 
juris, quam juxta mensuram potesta-
tis, qua subditum superat, competere 
statuo, quod in statu Naturali semper 
locum habet.”24
How this metaphysical and political break-
ing does run into the theory of affection?
Heidelberg, 1972. E, III, Praefatio. „It is true that 
very eminent men have not been wanting, to who-
se labour and industry we confess ourselves much 
indebted, who have written many excellent things 
about the right conduct of life, and who have gi-
ven to mortals counsels full of prudence, but no 
one so far as I know as determined the nature and 
strength of the affects, and what the mind is able 
to do toward controlling them. I remember, inde-
ed, that the celebrate Descartes, although he be-
lieved that the mind is absolute master over its 
own actions tried nevertheless to explain by their 
firsts causes human affects, and at the same time 
to show the way by which the mind could obtain 
absolute power over them; but in my opinion he 
has show nothing but the acuteness of his great 
intellect , as I shall make evident in the proper 
place“ (Spinoza B., Ethic: Demonstrated in Geo-
metrical Order and Divided Into Five Parts, Kes-
singer ,1996 pp. 104-105).
24 Spinoza B., Spinoza Opera, C. Gebhardt, Heidel-
berg / Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 
Heidelberg, 1972. Ep. 56. “As for politics, the dif-
ference between Hobbes and myself, […] is this: I 
leave always the natural law in its integrity and I 
argue that the sovereign power in a city has more 
right on subject only to the extent that has more 
power to it. And this always takes place in the sta-
te of nature” Ep. 56.
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Spinoza maybe is the philosopher who, 
much more than others, speaks about sen-
timents; he dedicates three of his five books 
in the Ethics to this argument. What distin-
guishes Spinoza from the others?
Spinoza‘s anomaly is thus based on think-
ing the affections as an integral part of 
human nature. This approach is explicitly 
spelled out in the introduction to the third 
part of Ethics25, where Spinoza complains 
that most of those who have written about 
emotions have treated them as „things that 
are outside of nature“ with the consequent 
attitude to mock, to despise or to pity the 
nature of affections. Ethics breaks with the 
traditional representation of the affectivity 
that pulls the emotions from a solipsistic 
horizon, and immediately places them in 
the middle of human relationships. Since 
for Spinoza the affectivity can be only rela-
tional, he, in contrast to Hobbes, says that a 
man is a God to man (homo hominis dei).26 
The Ethics is not an inner dialogue that re-
flect on a possible rational dominance over 
the passions.27 The emotions, as relational, 
are inscribed forever in a communal con-
25 Spinoza B., Spinoza Opera, C. Gebhardt, Heidel-
berg / Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 
Heidelberg, 1972. “Plerique, qui de affectibus et 
hominum vivendi ratione scripserunt, videntur 
non de rebus naturalibus, quae communes natu-
rae leges sequuntur, sed de rebus, quae extra na-
turam sunt, agere. Imo hominem in natura, velu-
ti imperium in imperio, concipere videntur. Nam 
hominem naturae ordinem magis perturbare 
quam sequi, ipsumque in suas actiones absolut-
am habere potentiam nec aliunde quam a se ipso 
determinari credunt. Humanae deinde impoten-
tiae et inconstantiae causam non communi na-
turae potentiae, sed nescio cui naturae humanae 
vitio tribuunt, quam propterea flent, rident, con-
temnunt vel, quod plerumque fit, detestantur; et, 
qui humanae mentis impotentiam eloquentius vel 
argutius carpere novit, veluti divinus habetur” E, 
III, Praefatio.
26 In the Ethics loneliness is the worst thing for the 
human being: Eth IV, 37 schol. I.
27 This is the approach that characterizes the theory 
of passions by Descartes.
text; this is also the only possible horizon 
within which human beings can actually be 
free.28
It seems interesting to dwell on this affec-
tivity theory that Spinoza proves in a geo-
metrical manner. That is, he tries to prove 
the functioning of the human affectivity 
by a geometrical method. Spinoza distin-
guishes, first, between the passion and af-
fection (Passio, Affectum) on the basis of an 
ontological and epistemological conception 
which sees the individual permanently sub-
jected to variations of its power.29 In other 
words, he calls affectum30 the affection or 
the modifications to which the mind and 
the body are subjected in terms of a change 
of power that can be negative or positive. 
The affectum is essentially a neutral force in 
which the person moves between the poles 
of activity and passivity. The term passio31 
designates, by contrast, the impossibility 
for humans to act according to their nature 
(utilitas). When it is affected by a passion, 
the individual acts primarily on the basis of 
external causes of which it has no adequate 
knowledge, of which, that is, it does not 
clearly understand  the causes. The indi-
28 A precious analysis of the most important politi-
cal concepts in Spinoza is by: Trucchio A., Come 
guidati da un‘unica mente. Questioni di antropo-
logia politica in Baruch Spinoza, Spinoziana 12, 
Edizioni Ghibli, Milano, 2009.
29 In this field Spinoza shares the same formulation 
of the mechanicism with Hobbes.
30 Spinoza B., Spinoza Opera, C. Gebhardt, Heidel-
berg / Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 
Heidelberg, 1972. “Per affectum intelligo corporis 
affectiones, quibus ipsius corporis agendi poten-
tia augetur vel minuitur, juvatur vel coercetur, et 
simul harum affectionum ideas. Si itaque alicujus 
harum affectionum adaequata possimus esse cau-
sa, tum per affectum actionem intelligo, alias pas-
sionem” E, III, def. III.
31 Spinoza B., Spinoza Opera, C. Gebhardt, Heidel-
berg / Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 
Heidelberg, 1972 „Hinc sequitur mentem eo plu-
ribus passionibus esse obnoxiam, quo plures ideas 
inadaequatas habet, et contra eo plura agere, quo 
plures habet adaequatas“ E, III, prop I, coroll.
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vidual acts on this level, and the concept 
of affectum, as we have seen, implies the 
unavoidable presence of external causes. 
Natural sociability or an abstract tendency 
to associate cannot hold people together. 
The individual is already taken in an affec-
tive network in which he acts according to 
(imitatio affectum) imitation of the affects‘ 
rules.32 Affections and desires of the indi-
vidual are, as we have tried to show, always 
included in complex dynamics and emo-
tional relationships. This theory of affects 
shows, in our opinion, Spinoza‘s radicalism 
in his ability to explain the mechanisms 
which works within the human community 
and which are the foundation of the politi-
cal and social choices.
These assumptions seem to be a reasonable 
basis for questioning the subject and value 
of trust (fides). This term seems to have a 
particular significance in the evolution of 
modern thought. As earlier mentioned, if 
Spinoza‘s „revolution“ is to depart from the 
problem of contract theory, it is necessary 
to specify this distance at this point be-
cause, rather than abolishing the contract, 
Spinoza makes it inactive by a new inter-
pretation of the concept of fides. To explain 
completely this step, a further investigation 
of the meaning of the Latin word fides shall 
be undertaken, relying on an essay written 
by Eduard Fraenkel.
Fraenkel33 tries to demonstrate that the use 
of this Latin word fides is far from the theo-
logical meaning which is covered with the 
32 In the words of Spinoza can be defined as follows: 
“Ex eo, quod rem nobis similem et quam nullo af-
fectu prosecuti sumus, aliquo affectu affici ima-
ginamur, eo ipso simili affectu afficimur.” Spinoza 
B., Spinoza Opera, C. Gebhardt, Heidelberg / Carl 
Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, Heidelberg, 
1972. “If we imagine a thing like us, toward which 
we have previously had no affect, to have some af-
fect, this gives us a similar affect” E, III, prop. 27.
33 Fraenkel E., Zur Geschichte des Wortes „fides“, 
Rheinisches Museum, LXXI. pp. 187-199.
passage of time. Trust (fides) establishes a 
relationship between individuals, which 
accredits very strongly, first in rhetorics 
(fidem facere) and then in the vocabulary 
of jurists as a guarantee and credit among 
men. 
“In conseguenza del fatto che abbiamo 
messo in lui la nostra fiducia, gli ab-
biamo consegnato qualcosa come un 
pegno con cui ci leghiamo a lui in un 
rapporto di fedeltà. Per questo la fede è 
tanto la fiducia che accordiamo a qual-
cuno, la fede che diamo- che la fiducia 
di cui godiamo presso qualcuno- la 
fede, il credito che abbiamo.”34
The philological analysis of Fraenkel here is 
even more important since it highlights the 
issue of transfer and credit that is a central 
point for introducing the main problem of 
the contractarians. The logic of the pact 
is rooted in the concept of the transfer of 
power to which individuals renounce in fa-
vor of a monarch or an assembly of repre-
sentatives. This transfer is based on an or-
ganizing principle which aims to establish a 
form of imperium (government which will 
evolve into Nation State). The problem of 
coexistence is thus solved in legal form and 
self-preservation of the individual guaran-
teed by common obedience to the laws. The 
problems that arise from such a conception 
of politics are manifold.
A first consequence is the unbridgeable 
split between the individual and the repre-
sentative‘s will. Modern political science, as 
we already said, saw the birth of a private 
34 Agamben G., Il tempo che resta. Un commento 
alla lettera ai Romani, Bollati Boringhieri, Tori-
no, 2000. p.107 “in consequence of the fact that 
we put our trust in him, we have given something 
like a pledge with which we bind ourselves to him 
in a relationship of fidelity. This is why faith is so 
much trust that we give to someone  -the belief 
that we give-  that the trust that we enjoy at so-
meone - the faith, the credit that we have.”
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citizen, an entity from which any form of 
political action is removed.35 The Hobbe-
sian sovereignty is resolved in normativ-
ity, in the neutralization of the conflict that 
can release the individual from the fight of 
everyone against everyone else but at the 
same time creates the conditions of its iso-
lation. The trust that individuals are given 
at the moment of the contract is given once 
and for all, and is transformed in society 
(Societas civilis) into an unconditional fi-
delity to the sovereign. The plurality of the 
State of Nature is thus replaced by a new 
concept: that of people, a single will, which 
is not simply the sum of all individuals, but 
becomes the idea of totality and unity of 
the unique and juridical equal citizens of 
the post-contract.
It is not difficult, at this point, to note the 
great aporia which underlies this concep-
tion of society. Therefore, the studies about 
political concepts, as those of Begriffsge-
schichte (conceptual history), have had the 
value of highlighting. The concept of the 
people, despite its claims to represent the 
concrete reality, is actually an abstract uni-
ty that through representation expresses a 
single will (at this point the will of each in-
dividual becomes private and does not face 
the public power anymore). The idealist 
character of the concept of people is evi-
dent here. In this perspective it is clear how 
the contractarian theories fail in their claim 
to establish an immanent power justified by 
the concepts of credits and transfer. That 
power arises from the bottom and is imma-
nent only in the moment of its foundation. 
With the establishment of the pact we at-
tend to the disappearance of the plurality 
of the individuals and of their constituent 
power. At the same time, the requirement 
35 „ognuno esprime un unico atto di volontà, che 
non è politico,  ma fonda lo spazio politico, nel 
quale egli non agirà-politicamente- più” Duso, La 
logica del potere, p.155.
of obedience to the law emerges with the 
concept of people.
At this point, the secular claim of politi-
cal forms that modernity offers us loses 
its meaning. On the contrary, we attend to 
the necessity to use a universal theoretical 
given again, such as that of people, in order 
to justify the validity of the pact. Modern 
political theory, even in its complex and 
seemingly immanent structure of repre-
sentation, preserves the necessity of a tran-
scendent movement.
Based on these premises, we cannot but 
question ourselves on the comprehensible 
connection which has developed between 
the Latin words fides and credere. The lat-
ter term assumed such importance among 
Christians to become all-encompassing and 
descriptive of a relationship solely theolog-
ical. As Benveniste, one of the best known 
linguists of this century, noted, the concept 
of faith, narrows into a strong bond with 
the belief, „*kred comme un mot distinct 
signifiant «force magique»; *kred-dhe- sig-
nifierait donc : «poser en quelqu‘un la *kred 
(d‘où résulte la confiance)»“.36 The terms of 
trust and belief bring with them a baggage 
which is both juridical-political and in the 
following also religious. Fides in this theo-
logical use (that we can here translate with 
belief or faith) shows how the foundation 
of the political body in contractarian think-
ing is not based on a circulation of power. It 
does not happen, in the pact-system, what 
Benveniste emphasizes: to believe means 
to „give something with the certainty of 
recovering“.37 It is through this trust given 
36 p.172. Cfr. E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des insti-
tutions indo-européennes, Les éditions de Minu-
it, Paris, 1969.*kred as a separate word meaning 
«magic power» *kred-dhe- therefore mean: «ask 
someone in the *kred (that result in the trust)».
37 „confier une chose avec la certitude de la récupé-
rer“ p. 177, Cfr. E. Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des 
institutions indoeuropéennes, Les éditions de Mi-
nuit, Paris, 1969.
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in an unconditional way that the meaning 
of belief rises in the word fides. The belief 
appears at the heart of the concepts of sov-
ereignty and representation in a movement 
of absolute transcendence. The emergence 
of fides in its religious sense implies an ab-
solute obedience to a transcendental power. 
The highest penalty to pay for the Societas 
civilis is falling back into the State of Nature 
where everyone has the right of imposing 
death on everyone. The logic here is that 
of sovereignty/obedience; disobedience is 
understood in terms of capital sin because 
it breaks the laws that had established the 
separation of good and evil.38 If we look at 
this form of political organization, another 
very important factor emerges; the con-
quered stability and the impossibility for 
the citizens to harm each other results not 
only in the exclusion of the citizens from 
actual political decisions, but also in the 
persistence of those sad and uncertain pas-
sions that it wanted erase.
In this framework, the passions do not re-
main anything to be exorcised anymore, 
but become instruments which the regents 
use to maintain unity and peace in the po-
litical body. Far from achieving a rational 
life, the people of post-contract society 
live their lives oscillating between the ir-
rationality of two sad passions: fear and 
hope. The right to kill does not disappear, 
but is simply transferred to the sovereign, 
a governor towards whom all subjects have 
timor dei.39  The subjects are afraid of the 
sovereign as of a divinity and live their 
lives in the hope of future good. The con-
stant uncertainty is the only instrument of 
government; it offers an inconstant stabil-
ity incapable of turning into real security. 
If the multitude is a hodgepodge of senti-
ments and rationality impossible to man-
38 Spinoza B., Ethic , IV, p.XXXVII, sc. II.
39 Fear of God.
age in its magmatic power, the people do 
not have access to a superior rational form 
of life. The pact is just breakwater against 
the unseemly movements of the multitude. 
It reconciles the political space imposing a 
reign of terror. The people can exist just in 
a improbably representations and the fear 
and hope block every autonomous move-
ment.
How does Spinoza break with this thought? 
As we have shown before, the theory of af-
fects by Spinoza prevents to think about a 
possible rational domain of the emotions. 
The Ethics offers, however, a possible route 
of liberation from the passions, from those 
affects, that is, trapping the human in a 
state of perpetual passivity and inactivity.
Spinoza‘s political works not only oppose 
contractarian theories but try to invalidate 
its construction: pacts are in fact for Spino-
za non servanda (not to be preserved), they 
do not imply, that is, an unconditional trust 
(belief ), and when they do not prove to be 
productive, they have to be abrogated.  The 
state should not aim to subjugate and force 
its subjects into fear, but to create a secure 
situation within which citizen can enhance 
their rationality and thus achieve true free-
dom. Human nature cannot tolerate the 
absolute constriction, and acting under the 
impulse of fear means accepting a lesser 
evil instead of enjoying a greater good.40 
Therefore, Spinoza´s affective dynamics do 
not become an instrument to use in order 
to subjugate its subjects, but a complex 
system of social constitution. The desires, 
affections and passions arise within the 
social relations. Far from being an isolated 
atom in collision with others the individual 
is constantly crossed by these forces which 
impel it to act in different ways. The con-
tract appears in these terms as a fictional 
40 Spinoza B., Ethic , IV, p. LXV.
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formal circulation of credit which can vary 
with the changing of its utilitas: 
“Fides alicui data, qua aliquis solis 
verbis pollicitus est, se hoc aut illud 
facturum, quod pro suo jure omittere 
poterat, vel contra, tamdiu rata manet, 
quamdiu ejus, qui fidem dedit, non 
mutatur voluntas. Nam qui potestatem 
habet solvendi fidem, is revera suo jure 
non cessit, sed verba tantum dedit. Si 
igitur ipse, qui naturae jure sui judex 
est, judicaverit, seu recte seu prave 
(nam errare humanum est), ex fide 
data plus damni quam utilitatis sequi, 
ex suae mentis sententia fidem solven-
dam esse censet, et naturae jure (per 
art. 9 hujus cap.) eandem solvet.”41
This theory has an enormous impact on po-
litical practice. Not only are individuals not 
expropriated of their constituent power, but 
there is space for the governed (subjects) to 
act politically through a continuous moni-
toring of the representatives. The word fi-
des changes in these conditions, removing 
any difference between natural/social and 
civil/state making the political space alive 
and dynamic. The community image that 
emerges from this framework is establis-
hed as a continuous transformation driving 
force. Fides in this case can not recur to 
its theological significance, may not recur 
as sovereignty and absolute power able to 
41 „The pledging of faith to any man, where one has 
but verbally promised to do this or that, which one 
might rightfully leave undone, or on the contrary, 
remains so long valid as the will of him that gave 
his word remains unchanged. For he that has au-
thority to break faith has, in fact, bated nothing of 
his own right, but only made a present of words. 
If, then, he, being by natural right judge in his own 
case, comes to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly 
(for „to err is human“), that more harm than profit 
will come of his promise, by the judgment of his 
own mind he decides that the promise should be 
broken, and by natural right (Sec. 9) he will break 
the same.”  TP, II, § 12.
subject completely, but rather as a credit 
that obliges the recipient and that can be, 
as we have tried to show earlier, revoked in 
view of a higher good.42 This is once again 
to oppose the modern thought that questi-
ons itself in terms of law and of sovereignty, 
a power that „circulates“ through the bo-
dies. This is not a question about the legal 
obligation to obey, about legitimate rights 
of sovereignty, but about the community 
in which we live, a horizon within which 
to search for happiness and freedom. If the 
relationships are the place of circulation of 
power, they cannot be grasped in the ma-
crostructures of sovereignty but in their 
microstructure. There is a real difference in 
the political space within which people can 
live free, researching, in the natural requi-
rement of the common life the best condi-
tions to live in safety. 
This proposal, as we were able to see, emp-
ties the problem of the community’s gene-
sis of significance and gives way to a much 
more interesting reflection; if reason and 
affections necessarily coexist, the search 
for a form of community life which can 
curb the deleterious effects for imitatio af-
fectum is only based on an immanent ratio-
nal strength that allows, even in its ambiva-
lence, the development of the affects of joy 
that increase the power of each individual. 
The affective theory not only remains in the 
center of political space, but establishes an 
opportunity of liberation.
Among the ways that modernity has drawn, 
that of social contract theory has prevailed. 
The evolution of modern legal systems and 
the forms of representative democracy 
are direct developments of the organizing 
principle of sovereignty and contract the-
ories. It is exactly this organizing ideology 
that forces us, even now, to think govern-
ment as a unification of multiplicity and 
42 Spinoza B., Ethic, Iv, p7.
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power as an issue of sovereignty and obe-
dience.43 As we have tried to show in this 
article, different forms of theory of affec-
tions in the modern age imply different 
images of community. Modern philosophy 
sees sentiments as something to subjugate 
or to rationalizing, but at the same time it 
has to „rediscover“ the role played by hu-
man feelings in the political action. What 
follows is a theoretical displacement that 
leads to reinterpret the human passions 
as means of managing and organizing the 
political space. If validity and the internal 
coherence of the society (in the contractual 
theory) are due to trust in the legitimacy of 
the sovereign and his entire establishment, 
fear and awe remain the main sentiments 
of the Leviathan. Spinoza thinks, in cont-
rast to Hobbes, that the State has to limit 
the passions (negative affects) and has to 
create a common space within which the 
individuals can develop their positive af-
fections. The sentiment of fides plays a key 
role in the theory of affection. Its theoreti-
cal stratification is a sign of a different way 
43 This is Foucalt‘s theory in Il faut défendre la so-
ciété: „Il ne faut pas oublier que la réactivation du 
droit romain, vers le milieu du Moyen Age, qui a 
été le grand phénomène autour et a partir duquel 
s‘est reconstitué l‘édifice juridique dissocié après 
la chute de l‘Empire romain, a été l‘un des instru-
ments techniques constitutif du pouvoir monar-
chique, autoritaire, administratif et, finalement, 
absolu. Formation, donc, de l‘édifice juridique au-
tour du personnage royal, à la demande même et 
au profit du pouvoir royal. Lorsque cet édifice ju-
ridique, dans les siècles suivants, aura échappé au 
contrôle royal, lorsqu‘il sera retourné contre le 
pouvoir royal, ce qui sera en question, ce sera tou-
jours les limites de ce pouvoir, la question con-
cernant ses prérogatives. Autrement dit, je crois 
que le personnage central, dans tout l‘édifice juri-
dique occidental, c‘est le roi. […] Donc, le questi-
on, pour moi, c‘est de court-circuiter ou d‘éviter 
ce problème, central pour le droit, de la souverai-
neté et de l‘obéissance des individus soumis à cet-
te souveraineté, et de faire apparaître, à la place 
de la souveraineté et de l‘obéissance , le problè-
me de la domination et de l‘assujettissement.” M. 
Foucault, Il faut défendre la société, éd Gallimard, 
Paris, 1997. 
to conceive the community or to found it. 
The history of this word has helped us to 
reconstruct the manifold meaning of fides 
and to understand the different perspecti-
ve of its use in the modern political theo-
ry. In particularly we spoke about the need 
to found a community on trust (contract 
theory) in polemic relation to the obser-
vation that a community is constituted by 
circulating affects (Spinoza‘s politic theo-
ry). Spinoza teaches us that the use of trust 
in order to have a well ordered society and 
social cohesion is an ideological invention 
of the pact-system. To understand the im-
portance of this statement it is necessary to 
keep in mind Spinoza‘s reject of Cartesian‘s 
individual theory. The opposition between 
mind and body creates a person split from 
the world; in this context the society turns 
in a simple sum of individuals. It is necessa-
ry to abandon this contrast to understand 
that the community is the precondition for 
the existence of the individual and a space 
within he acts.
Every narration of the creation of a com-
munity brings an effort of producing a 
unity of the multiplicity. Spinoza suggests 
to abandon any hypothesis of foundation 
and to understand the society as a space 
overstep by manifold human sentiments. 
Only with this assumption it is interesting 
to study the role that fides plays in a human 
society. This is an ambiguous role because 
it acts as a surrogate form of identification 
and affiliation in a community and as its 
funding myth. It is because of this ambi-
guous working of the sentiments that peo-
ple have to weigh in order to understand 
the internal dynamic of his social context. 
At this point we have nothing more to do 
than to question the affects in order to dis-
cover the actual mechanisms that regulate 
contemporary societies. The contemporary 
philosophy follow Spinoza in this step and 
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try to think about a political space where 
rediscovery the real dimension of political 
action and participation.
